LaunchKit · 2026
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update-signature-verifier

Helps verify the cryptographic integrity of skill updates by checking whether each version is signed.

0
290 downloads
by @andyxinweiminicloud

Setup & Installation

openclaw skills install @andyxinweiminicloud/update-signature-verifier

Or with the ClawHub CLI, for registry-managed skill folders outside a full OpenClaw workspace:

npx clawhub install update-signature-verifier

What This Skill Does

Verifies the cryptographic chain of custody across skill version history. Detects key changes between versions, unsigned updates, and signature gaps that may indicate a skill was transferred, re-signed by a new controller, or modified without authorization.

Most agent ecosystems verify signatures only at install time and skip checking whether subsequent updates were signed by the same key, leaving a gap that supply chain attackers exploit through legitimate update channels.

When to use it

  • Auditing a skill's full version history before trusting a recent update
  • Detecting an unannounced signing key rotation between versions
  • Identifying unsigned versions in an otherwise signed release history
  • Comparing signing key fingerprints across two specific skill versions
  • Flagging skills where a key change coincided with new outbound network behavior

Example Workflow

Here's how your AI assistant might use this skill in practice.

INPUT

User asks: Verify signature chain for 'data-aggregator' skill, versions 1.0.0 through 1.3.2

AGENT
  1. 1Fetches per-version signing metadata for the specified skill across all listed versions
  2. 2Compares signing key fingerprints version by version to detect key changes
  3. 3Identifies unsigned versions and records their position in the version sequence
  4. 4Checks whether any new signing keys are registered in the publisher's JWKS endpoint
  5. 5Generates a chain-of-custody report with a completeness rating and recommended actions
OUTPUT

Chain-of-custody rated BROKEN: version 1.2.0 is unsigned, signing key changed from ed25519:a3f9c2 to ed25519:b7d441 without a published announcement, and the new key is absent from the publisher's JWKS. Risk rated HIGH. Recommended actions include auditing the outbound endpoint added in 1.2.0 and pinning to 1.1.0 pending publisher explanation.